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STANDING TO SUE IN lOb-5 ACTIONS: EASON V. GMAC AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE BIRNBAUM DOCTRINE
I. Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing concern among judges,' prac-
titioners,' and commentatorss over the tentacle-like expansion of the concept
of securities "fraud" as developed in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, for, considered alone, its sweeping language portends of an "almost com-
pletely undefined liability."4 In an effort to thwart this feared development, a
variety of judicially imposed roadblocks to civil suit has been devised, the most
enduring and, certainly, most controversial being the so-called "purchaser-seller"
limitation on standing to sue first set down in Birnbaum V. Newport Steel Corp.'
In the wake of the seemingly inexorable march of § 10(b), however, most of
these judicial talismans have crumbled so that today the Birnbaum rule stands
virtually alone-a solitary sentinel guarding against what many fear is the
potential metamorphosis of federal securities regulation into a far-reaching body
of "federal corporate law." Within this context, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals recently decided Eason v. GMAC,6 a case in which the continued via-
bility of Birnbaum was squarely challenged.
This note will trace the approach taken by the Eason court in resolving the
Birnbaum standing issue, analyze that resolution in terms of existing precedent,
and evaluate its significance as a salutary rule in its own right as well as its impact
upon Birnbaum and § 10(b).
1 Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1358 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1066 (1972); Levine v. Seilon, Inc. 439 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 1971); Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970);
Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 909 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 889 (2d Cir. 1968)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2 Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule 10b-5?, 24 Bus. Law. 69 (1968):
What lies ahead under Rule lOb-5?
Really, it seems to me that it is quite simple. Under Rule 10b-5 whenever stock is
sold, if the price goes up-the seller can sue the buyer; if the price goes down-the
buyer can sue the seller; if the price remains absolutely the same, each can sue the
other for interest.
Unnamed corporate attorney, quoted id.
3 Bradford, Rule lOb-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 Buff. L. Rev. 205
(1970); Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggran-
dizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969); Patton, The "Purchase or Sale" Restriction of SEC Rule
lOb-5-Judicial Extension of a Federal Remedy, 18 Cath. U.L. Rev. 463 (1969); Bahlman,
Rule 10b-5: The Case for its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation Law, 37 U. Cinn. L. Rev.
727 (1968) ; Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains in the Development of Federal Cor-
porate Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1361 (1965) ; Ruder, Pitfalls in the Develop-
ment of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev.
185 '(1964); Kaplan, Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. Law. 868 (1963).
4 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970); see also SEC v. Nat'l Secs.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
5 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).




The Securities Act of 19337 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 were
the central facets of a comprehensive scheme of federal securities legislation9
comprising the New Deal response to the financial debacle precipitated by the
stock market crash in 1929.1 The basic thrust of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts
was disclosure." The Securities Act sought to compel disclosure in the initial
distribution of securities; the Exchange Act focused upon disclosure in the after-
market. Additionally, the Securities Act contained a general anti-fraud provision,
§ 17(a). 2 In 1934 a similar anti-fraud provision was added to the Exchange
Act, § 10(b).1 A "catch-all" provision, 14 § 10(b) was designed to provide the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with a flexible means of closing
loopholes which might arise in other provisions of the securities acts.' 5 As such,
it was couched in terms of considerable breadth-auguring significant potential
for judicial expansion. 6
Since it was not self-executing, § 10(b) lay dormant for nearly eight years,
until 1942. In that year, Rule l0b-5'7 was promulgated" by the SEC pursuant
7 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
8 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
9 The other acts were: Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79
et seq. (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq. (1970); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (1970).
10 Investigations of the stock market collapse revealed widespread fraud, manipulation,
"insider" trading, concealment, and a general victimization of the public investor in the secu-
rities industry. See Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. and 2d Sess. (1933-34) (Pecora Investigation).
11 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). In describing the
legislative intent behind the securities acts, the Court noted: "A fundamental purpose, common
to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." Id.
at 186. See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Wilko v. Swan, 326 U.S.
427, 430 (1953).
12 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
13 Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . .. [t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
14 1 A. BROMBERO, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 2.2 (1969).
15 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
16 3 L. Loss, SEcURrxaEs REOULATION 1424 & n.7 (2d ed. 1961).
17 Rule 1Ob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
18 Rule 10b-5 was originally numbered as X-10B-5 since, at that time, all rules promulgated
by the SEC under the Exchange Act were prefixed with the designation "X." This more exotic
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to authority granted by § 23(a) 9 of the Exchange Act and § 10(b) itself.
Although originally intended merely to fill the loophole created by a legislative
"gap" between § 17(a) of the Securities Act and § 15(c) (1)2' of the Exchange
Act,2 Rule 10b-5 has been called the "focal point for a spectacular growth in
the law governing civil liability for transactions in securities."22 Its promulgation
opened a Pandora's Box. Today, "one can scarcely find an issue of the . . .
Federal Supplement and Federal Reporter that does not contain an opinion on §
10(b) ",23
B. The Implied Civil Remedy Concept
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,24 decided four years after Rule lOb-5
was issued, was the harbinger of this deluge of litigation. In Kardon a share-
holders' suit was brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to recover damages
from the corporate defendant and others for allegedly conspiring to induce, and
inducing, the plaintiffs to sell their stock for less than its true value through
fraudulent misrepresentations of certain facts. While conceding that no express
provision in either § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 allowed for private rights of action,"q
the district court, per Judge Kirkpatrick, held that "in view of the general pur-
pose of the [Exchange] Act, the mere omission of an express provision for civil
liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies."2 6 Although
there have been occasional detractors," the Kardon "implied civil remedy"
concept in § 10(b) cases has never seriously been challenged. 8 In 1971 the
Supreme Court put to rest what lingering doubts remained clouding its use.29
designation remained until a general renumbering was undertaken by the SEC in 1956. It
still appears occasionally in the case law and commentaries.
19 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1970).
21 SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act prohibited the use of fraud in the "sale" of securities by "any person." Section
15(c) (1) of the Exchange Act prohibited the use of fraud in the "purchase" or "sale" of
securities by "brokers" and "dealers." Hence, neither section covered the purchase of securities
by any person and, therefore, a legislative "gap"* was created. See generally Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967).
22 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1967).
23 Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); see also SEC v. Nat'l Secs., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969); 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIs LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5
§ 2.5 (6) (1969).
24 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
25 The Securities Exchange Act does contain several remedial sections which expressly
provide a civil cause of action: 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970) (liability for manipulation of secu-
rities on a registered exchange); 15 U.S.C. § 78p (c) (1970) (liability for "insider" trading);
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970) (liability for inclusion of misleading statements in registration state-
ments). Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 so provide.
26 Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
27 See, e.g., Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind
in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 423, 431 (1968); Ruder, Pitfalls
in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5,
59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 185, 196-98 (1964); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb,5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 627, 648 (1963).
28 Few quarreled with Kardon because the action there was brought by sellers of securities
against their purchasers, a cause of action unavailable under the Securities Act since its appli-
cable remedial provision protected only "purchasers." Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), expanded the coverage of the Kardon principle to injured purchasers
as well as sellers.
29 Supt. of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
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C. The Birnbaum Doctrine
The emergence of the implied civil remedy, coupled with the omnipresent
risk of perilously expensive liability under § 10(b)," prompted many courts to
fashion restraints on the class of persons eligible to recover in civil actions brought
under Rule lOb-55' even though no such limitations are prescribed in the statu-
tory or administrative language." The most formidable, most enduring, 4 and
most controversial 5 of these judicial constructs was that first imposed in Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp. 6-- the "purchaser-seller" rule. Hailed as the
"landmark case concerning those who qualify as plaintiffs to sue under § 10(b)-
Rule lOb-5,"'  Birnbaum is credited with being the "progenitor of much of the
law and conventional wisdom in the 1Ob-5 area."3" It arose in the context of a
derivative suit filed by the minority interest shareholders of Newport Steel
accusing its controlling shareholder of misrepresenting the circumstances of an
attractive merger offer and then selling his shares in collusion with others to a
third party at a substantial premium after rejecting the merger bid. The com-
plaint was dismissed in the district court, the fatal disability being that the plain-
tiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities in the complained of trans-
action. On appeal the judgment of the district court was affirmed. Judge
Augustus Hand, speaking for the court of appeals, explained that, in its view,
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 were directed "solely at that type of misrepresentation
or fraudulent practice usually associated with the purchase or sale of securities
rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that Rule
X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller."3 In so
holding, the Birnbaum court articulated two distinct and independent principles
30 The risk is twofold: (1) subjection to substantial defense costs and exorbitant judg-
ments; (2) subjection to public opprobrium and obloquy. See Globus v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 '(2d Cir. 1969). Because the stakes are so high, very few claims
involving Rule 10b-5 have reached the merits. If the plaintiff survives a dismissal motion, the
corporate defendant will uniformly seek a settlement rather than risk a court fight. 1 A. BROM-
BERG, SECURITMS LAW: FRAuD--SEC RULE lOb-5 §§ 1.3(2), 9.1 '(1969).
31 See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266-67 (1st Cir. 1966) (reasonableness
of reliance); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (reliance); Britt
v. Cyril Bath Co., 290 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (causation); Joseph v. Farnsworth
Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (privity).
32 3 L. Loss, SECURTrIsS REGULATION 1763-67 (2d ed. 1961).
33 James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1973).
34 Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970). As the court vividly put it:
"Birnbaum has been shot at by expert marksmen.. . . Bloody, but unbowed, Birnbaum still
stands." Id.
35 Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 Ala. L. Rev. 543 (1971); Fuller,
Another Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day," 25 U. Miami
L. Rev. 131 (1970); Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to
Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 Buff. L. Rev. 93 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of
the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968); Comment,
The Birnbaum Doctrine-An Aging Rule Reexamined by the Courts, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 715
(1971); Comment, SEC Rule lOb-5---"In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Any
Security" Restriction: Need for Analytical Precision, 5 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 28 (Aug.
1969); Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule 10-5, 14 Vill. L.
Rev. 499 (1969); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining
Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 Geo. L.J. 1177 (1968).
36 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
37 Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1970).
38 Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 730 n.41 (2d Cir. 1972).
39 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
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interpreting the last crucial phase of Rule l0b-5-the "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" terminology. The first principle, that only a
"defrauded purchaser or seller" could bring a cMl action under Rule 10b-5, has
since been uniformly regarded as a standing requirement.40  Aside from this
procedural roadblock, a second principle, termed the "substantive" ruling,41 fore-
closed the redress of claims under Rule lOb-5 that only stated a cause of action
involving "fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs." Together, these dual
postulates constituted the Birnbaum Doctrine, a proposition which, although sub-
ject to immediate criticism by commentators42 and caution in the courts, 3 enjoyed
practically uncontested application throughout the federal courts for over ten
years.
Nevertheless, in the last decade the Birnbaum Doctrine has been stretched
considerably by courts eager to bring within the purview of Rule 1Ob-5 additional
types of misconduct and a wider variety of plaintiffs than that permitted under
traditional definitions of "purchaser" or "seller" of securities. At increasingly
frequent intervals, judges have fashioned "constructive" purchasers or sellers
to elude the strict prescriptions of the Birnbaum rule." So, too, other courts
have relied on a "forced" purchase or sale of securities fiction to accomplish a
similar result.45 Moreover, where the relief sought is merely prophylactic or
injunctive in nature, a number of courts have simply ignored Birnbaum." Finally,
a duster of recent decisions has stripped away layer upon layer of judicial insula-
tion surrounding Birnbaum's substantive holding," generating a coalescence of
40 Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 Ala. L. Rev. 543, 547 (1971).
Interestingly enough, no mention of the term "standing" appears in the Birnbaum opinion
itself.
41 Folk, Corporation Law Deuelopments-1969, 56 Va. L. Rev. 755, 812-14 (1970).
42 See, e.g., Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 832-35
(1956).
43 See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir.
1952).
44 James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973) (beneficiary of testamentary
trust); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (beneficial shareholders in deben-
ture redemption plan) ; Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971) (trustee-
in-bankruptcy); Hooper v. Mountain States Secs. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) '(issuer
of stock).
45 Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 858 (1971) (receiver in liquidation proceeding); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383
(5th Cir. 1970) (shareholder in liquidation proceeding); A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375
F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (stockbroker in incomplete brokerage transaction); Vine v. Bene-
ficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967) (shareholders in short form merger).
46 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Mut. Shares Corp. v. Genesco,
Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783
(8th Cir. 1967).
47 These include:
(1) "Interstate instrumentalities" See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (intrastate use of telephone within prohibition of the Act) ;
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965) (manipulative device itself need not be
transmitted through the mails).
'(2) "Privity" see, e.g., Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) ; see also 3 L. Loss, SacuRrrins REGULATION 1767 (2d ed. 1961).
(3) "Deception"' see, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see also Note, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 1273, 1276-78 (1972).
(4) "Common law fraud"see, e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
(5) "Reliance" see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153
(1972).
(6) "In connection with" see, e.g., Supt. of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
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the state cause of action for breach of corporate fiduciary duty with the federal
action for securities fraud under § 10(b). s The overall result of these assaults
on the Birnbaum Doctrine has been a merger of its dual postulates into a singular
whole-the purchaser-seller standing limitation. This remnant of the Birnbaum
Doctrine has continued to enjoy wide, if not unswerving, application in the
federal courts49 at least with respect to actions for money damages,5" notwith-
standing occasional-and heretofore premature-judicial obituaries."'
III. The Eason Decision
The most serious challenge to the continued vitality of the Birnbaum pur-
chaser-seller limitation was issued recently by the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Eason v. GMAC.52 Eason arose from an "ill-advised""s corporate acqui-
sition. In the fall of 1969 Dave Waite Pontiac, Inc. (Waite), an automobile
agency, entered negotiations with the Bank Service Corporation (Bank Service)
for the sale of its automobile leasing division, Wraite Leasing, to Bank Service.
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), which financed the entire
Waite operation, including Waite Leasing, participated in these negotiations and
actively sought effectuation of the sale. An agreement was reached on October
31, 1969, whereby the assets of Waite Leasing were sold to Bank Service in ex-
change for 7,000 shares of Bank Service common stock and its assumption of
various liabilities of Waite Leasing owing to GMAC. Additionally, at the in-
sistence of GMAC, which desired further protection for its investment in Waite
Leasing from among "persons of substantial financial worth," ' three shareholders
of Bank Service-W. D. Eason (Eason), M. 0. Satrom, and J. M. Satrom (Sat-
rom)--executed personal guaranties to GMAC regarding payment of all liabilities
assumed by Bank Service and owing to GMAG as well as any future indebtedness
that might arise between the two corporations in connection with the leasing
enterprise.5 Thereafter, Bank Service undertook operation of the leasing business
in its own name and, eventually, in the name of a wholly owned subsidiary, Gen-
eral Auto Leasing and Rental Corporation (GAL).
(1971); Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972); Drachman
v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 '(2d Cir. 1972).
(7) "Usually associated with" see, e.g., A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1967).
48 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
49 In considering adoption of the Birnbaum rule, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
observed: "[Elvery other Court of Appeals that has considered this issue has adopted the
'purchaser-seller' requirement." Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 4-64 F.2d 339, 342 (9th
Cir. 1972).
50 Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968); see also DeLancey, Rule 10b-5-
A Recent Profile, 25 Bus. Law. 1355, 1369-70 (1970).
51 See, e.g., Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 839-40 (D.N.J. 1972);
Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
52 No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,344, at 95,159.
53 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Eason v. GMAC, No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28,
1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 1 94,344, at 95,159.
54 Id. at 4-A.
55 The same parties, in their capacity as shareholders, had previously agreed to indemnify
Waite with respect to the liabilities being assumed by Bank Service pursuant to the purchase
agreement. Id. at 8.
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The leasing venture was never profitable after acquisition despite repeated
infusions of capital by Eason and Satrom in an unsuccessful effort to revive the
faltering investment. After sustaining operating losses for nearly twenty consecu-
tive months, the drain on working capital became such that GAL was forced into
insolvency dragging with it the parent corporation, Bank Service. Subsequently,
Bank Service defaulted on the obligations owing GMAC and the three guarantors
were called upon for indemnification. 6 Failing to recover the amount due,
GMAG instituted a state action to enforce the guaranty agreements naming the
three guarantors as codefendants. Eason and Satrom, individually and as repre-
sentatives of GAL and Bank Service, filed a countersuit in the federal courts
grounded upon § 10(b) naming Waite and GMAC as codefendants. The fed-
eral action alleged that fraudulent misrepresentations57 and material omissions s
had occurred in connection with the purchase and sale of securities in violation
of Rule lOb-5. The three guarantors prayed for relief in the form of a rescission
of the original purchase agreement, the guaranties, and all evidence of indebted-
ness related thereto; and additionally, sought recovery of money damages in an
amount of at least $500,000.00 for themselves collectively and a like amount for
the defunct corporations they represented.59 The district court, citing Birnbaum,
dismissed the guarantors' third amended complaint and denied leave to file a
fourth, ruling that the guarantors in themselves had no standing to sue under
Rule 10b-5 since they were neither "purchasers" nor "sellers" of securities in the
complained-of transaction and that a derivative suit on behalf of the defunct
corporations was likewise inappropriate."0
56 The balance due on the obligations owing GMAG exceeded $300,000.00. Id. at 2.
57 The alleged fraudulent misrepresentations included, inter alia, that:
(1) Waite Leasing and the automobile leasing business generally were profitable
and would continue to be so after acquisition.
(2) The lease contracts provided sufficient cash flow to Waite Leasing so that, after
deducting operating expenses, Bank Service and GAL could retire their financial
obligations to GMAC.
(3) In purchasing Waite Leasing, Bank Service was receiving approximately $120,-
000.00 in equity.
(4) Waite Leasing was financially sound and therefore no further capital outlay
would be required to operate the business.
Id. at 6-A.
58 The alleged fraudulent nondisclosures included, inter alla, that:
(1) The structure of the lease contracts was such that lease income did not and
could not cover the expenses of operating the business.
(2) Waite Leasing and Waite were in poor financial condition.
(3) The expinses of operating Waite Leasing were "hidden" in other operations of
Waite.
(4) Waite Leasing was not and could not be independently profitable.
(5) There was little or no equity in the Waite Leasing assets purchased.
(6) In the fall of 1969, GM was changing its policy of giving fleet discounts and
volume discounts to automobile leasing companies and that such discounts would
soon be discontinued.
(7) At the time of purchase, GM and GMAC were conducting a national program
to have its dealers dispose of their leasing divisions and, in particular, were urging
Waite to dispose of Waite Leasing because of its unprofitability.
Id. at 6-A-8-A.
59 Id. 12-A-13-A.
60 GMAC and Waite successfully contended below that (1) under Birnbaum, a party must
be either a purchaser or seller of a security in order to maintain a lOb-5 action; (2) although
the notes guaranteed were admittedly securities, the guarantors were not technically purchasers
thereof; and (3) even though the guarantors were sellers of the guaranty agreement, they
were not sellers of a "security" for purposes of Rule 10b-5. Thus, the defendants-appellees
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On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the guarantors presented
four issues for review. 61 The court of appeals, per Judge Stevens, chose to focus
solely upon the third enumerated issue: whether the Birnbaum rule served to
block the plaintiffs-appellants' action assuming they were neither purchasers nor
sellers of a security in the complained-of transaction.62
A. The Standing Question
The court of appeals conceded at the outset that the Birnbaum purchaser-
seller limitation had consistently been described as a "standing" requirement.6 " It
cautioned against a too casual usage of that term, however, noting that it was
subject to two quite dichotomous interpretations: (1) "whether the plaintiff is
a person who has suffered a legal wrong";64 and (2) "whether he has a sufficient
interest in a real controversy with the defendant to entitle him to invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court. 6 5 Concluding that the purchaser-seller limitation
had been construed in this latter "constitutional and jurisdictional sense,"6 the
court found such an interpretation to be "unwarranted"6 and, moreover, super-
fluous to a determination of the standing question in a 10b-5 suit:
[W]e have no doubt that the plaintiffs' interest in the controversy before us is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III. Indeed, the parties with
a vital stake in the outcome of the dispute are the individual plaintiffs on
the one hand and GMAC on the other...
This dispute may certainly be regarded as a "case" or "controversy" between
these parties within the meaning of Article 111.68
B. The Protection Question
A "more useful"6 9 question, according to the court of appeals, was "whether
were successful in using Birnbaum as a shield to disarm the guarantors of their 10b-5 claim
while simultaneously pursuing the state cause of action against these same guarantors. Id. at 3.
61 The issues presented were:
(1) whether the appellants were "purchasers" of the notes guaranteed for purposes
of Rule lOb-5.
(2) whether the guaranty contracts constituted a "sale" of securities for purposes of
Rule lOb-5.
(3) whether the Birnbaum rule served to block the appellants' action assuming that
they were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities in the complained-of transaction.
(4) whether a derivative action on behalf of the now-defunct corporations was
appropriate.
Id. at 4-6.
62 Judge Stevens made clear the intention of the court of appeals:
Since the necessity of stretching the definitions of "purchasers," "sellers," and "secu-
rities" is a result of the Birnbaum rule we think it appropriate to examine the viability
of that rule first. For purposes of decision, therefore, we assume that the only purchase
or sale of securities involved in the transaction complained of was the transfer of
7,000 shares of stock from Bank Service to Waite, and we reject the suggestion that
plaintiffs should be characterized as "sellers" of stock.
Eason v. GMAC, No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973), slip opinion at 3, CGH FED. SEC. L.
RE'. f 94,344, at 95,160.
63 Id. at 4, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,344, at 95,161.
64 Id.




69 Id. at 6, OGH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 94,344, at 95,161.
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the plaintiffs were members of the class for whose special benefit Rule 10b-5 was
adopted."7 Acknowledging that Judge Hand's formulation in Birnbaum was in
form an identification of persons to whom Rule 10b-5 afforded protection, the
Eason court sought to demonstrate, by reference to a series of recent decisions,"1
how the course of judicial opinion over the last decade had actually shifted,
recognizing a class of "protected" persons extending beyond mere purchasers and
sellers of securities to a much more inclusive group-"investors. 7 2 To support
further its contention, the court of appeals cited the plain language of § 10(b)
and Rule 101>-57' recent statements by the Supreme Court adumbrating its ac-
ceptance of an "investor" approach to Rule 10b-5, 4 and a series of pronounce-
ments by the SEC in its role as amicus curiae urging abolition of the Birnbaum
rule in favor of a more flexible approach to 101>-5 litigants. 5
Convinced that the Birnbaum. rule should no longer be controlling, the court
of appeals rejected it and fashioned its own interpretation of persons protected
under Rule 10b-5.7 The "Eason. approach" extended the coverage of Rule 10b-5
to those persons who suffered significant injury in their capacity as investors as a
direct consequence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction even
though their participation in the complained-of transaction did not involve either
the purchase or sale of securities.
Under this formulation the Eason plaintiffs were adjudged to have suffered
a legal injury justiciable in the federal courts notwithstanding that they were
neither purchasers nor sellers in the traditional Birnbaum sense."'
C. The Overriding Considerations Question
Perhaps anticipating the furor its "investor" approach might foment, the
Eason court attempted to dispel two of the most persistent bugaboos surrounding
the Birnbaum rule in its closing remarks. To the contention that its decision
would open the floodgates to federal litigation, the court countered that the
"volume of 101>-5 litigation has already expanded dramatically and will no
doubt continue to do so whether or not the purchaser-seller limitation is re-
jected. 7 8 It added that the "causation" test it formulated would act as a limit
70 Id., CCH FED. Sac. L. RaP. 94,344, at 95,162.
71 Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, - F.2d - (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1973),
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,191 at 94,816; James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d. 944 '(6th
Cir. 1973); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967); A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.
1967); Hooper v. Mountain States Secs. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
72 Eason v. GMAC, No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973), Slip opinion at 8, OCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. % 94,344, at 95,162.
73 Id.
74 Id., CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 1 94,344, at 95,163.
75 Id. at 8, 10, CCH FED. Sac. L. RaP. 94,344, at 95,163, 95,164.
76 Id. at 8, OCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,344, at 95,163.
77 Id. at 8-9, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 94,344, at 95,163. Two considerations were con-
trolling in the court's determination: (1) the guarantors' interest as shareholders of Bank
Service was apparently sufficient to induce them to execute substantial personal guarantees to
GMAC, thereby fulfilling the "significant injury" and "investor" aspects of the Eason test;
(2) as individual guarantors, the appellants were direct parties to the transaction in dispute,
thus meeting the "direct consequence" aspect of the test.
78 Id. at 9, OCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. % 94,344, at 95,163.
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on the availability of private reliefm and that, even assuming the abandonment of
Birnbaum would significantly increase the courts' workload, it could not for that
reason "reject what we believe to be a correct interpretation of the statute or the
rule.""s Similarly, in regard to the argument that abolition of Birnbaum would
debilitate national consistency in application of Rule 10b-5, the court of appeals
retorted that the present extent of such consistency was "overstated"'" and "less
important than an independent appraisal of an important issue arising in an area
of the law which, despite the age of the statute, is still in an embryonic stage of
development."82
IV. Pitfalls in Practicability
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals supplanted the Birnbaum rule
with its own "investor" approach grounded upon causal connection. While the
"causal connection" test is not in itself new," the bold swath in long-established
legal doctrine which the court of appeals cut to grant relief to the Eason
plaintiffs 4 parallels in significance the stance taken earlier by the Kardon court
and harbors much the same explosive potentiality. As such, the approach of the
Eason court bears careful scrutiny.
A. Response to the Standing Question
Since persons seeking relief under § 10(b) are provided no express statutory
remedy,85 their asserted rights of action must be determined at the outset under
the generalized "common law" rules of standing extant in the federal courts.
Mindful of Mr. Justice Douglas' admonition that "generalizations about standing
are largely worthless,"86 one working premise in this area is safely assumed:
"[he question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the frame-
work of Article III which restricts judicial power to 'cases' and 'controversies.' "8"
The Eason court addressed the standing question in this constitutional and juris-
dictional sense, limiting its scope to whether the appellants had a sufficient
interest in a real controversy with the appellees to entitle them to invoke federal
jurisdiction under the § 10(b) headland. But, in addition to the Article III
question, the determination of standing in the federal courts may involve the use
of other rules as well. These ancillary rules, developed by the judiciary in the
exercise of self-restraint 8 and designed to mitigate the flood of litigants swirling
79 Id. at 10, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 94,344, at 95,163-64.
80 Id., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,344, at 95,164.
81 Id. at 11, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 94,344, at 95,164.
82 Id.
83 Prior to the Eason decision, at least three other courts had espoused the adoption of a
"causation" approach to protected parties under Rule 1Ob-5: Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d
161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433,
436 '(6th Cir. 1969); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 840 (D.N.J. 1972).
84 In the cases cited at note 83 supra, the relief sought was exclusively injunctive in nature.
The Eason plaintiffs sought rescission and money damages. Hence, in adapting the "causation"
test to the Eason plaintiffs, the court of appeals entered virgin territory.
85 Note 25 supra.
86 Ass'n. of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 154; see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
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about the federal court system,89 have turned the standing question into a
"complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction."90
Exemplary of this stratified approach to the determination of standing is
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,91 decided by
the Supreme Court in 1970. Camp involved a competitor's suit challenging an
administrative ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency where the plaintiff's
standing to sue absent statutory authorization was in issue. In ruling against the
plaintiff, the Supreme Court relied on a two-pronged test of standing: (1)
whether the plaintiff had alleged that the challenged action caused him "injury
in fact, economic or otherwise";92 and (2) whether the interest sought to be
protected by the plaintiff was "arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected"93 by the statute.
Since normally both aspects of the Camp test must be fulfilled before the
plaintiff is accorded standing in a federal action where his right to relief is not
authorized by statute and since the Birnbaum rule is no more than a reflection of
Camp's second test, it may be argued that the Eason court in repudiating
Birnbaum effectively overrode a prescription on standing mandated by the
Supreme Court as well. At first glance this suggestion is appealing, particularly
when placed in the context of the statute invoked. On closer examination, how-
ever, such a view of Eason appears to overlook what should be the primary con-
sideration in any standing question-the "facts and circumstances surrounding
the particular claim presented."9 4
In cases challenging administrative actions, Camp's two-pronged test insures
that the plaintiff is a party "most immediately concerned"95 with the administra-
tive action; but in private actions for damages brought pursuant to Rule lOb-5,
such as Eason, the plaintiff is seeking primarily to protect his own interests and
only secondarily to foster the interests of the public in preventing violations of
lOb-5. Therefore, the purpose of the Camp test, to determine whether a given
party will be a "reliable private attorney general," '98 makes it inapplicable to the
lOb-5 context where the concern is ascertaining the existence of a genuine "case'
or "controversy.""ar Furthermore, even if an application of the Camp test to the
Eason plaintiffs were undertaken, it would generally involve inquiry into the
merits, 's an excursion the Camp court expressly sought to avoid.99 Finally, the
Eason approach would seem to embody both aspects of the Camp test in its own
right although at different stages in the proceedings. Thus, the "injury in fact"
(damnum) aspect would be decided in Eason at the determination of standing.
The "legal wrong" (injuria) aspect would be postponed until proof of causal con-
89 Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1968)'; see also Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1970).
90 United States v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 97-99 (1968).
91 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
92 Id. at 152.
93 Id. at 153.
94 Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J. 1968).
95 Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 637 (1971).
96 Ass'n. of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
97 See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 469 (1970).
98 See Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J. 1972).
99 Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 158 (1970).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
nection was heard. So, the Eason court appears to satisfy Camp's second test as
well, albeit with less specificity than suggested in Birnbaum.
B. Response to the Protection Question
The Eason court discarded the long-standing contention that Rule l0b-5
applied solely to purchasers and sellers of securities in favor of a more expansive
definition of protected parties, collected under the general rubric of "investors."
This departure from the Birnbaum rationale in an action for money damages was
predicated upon four bases of support each of which has been, at various times
and in varying degrees of intensity, the subject of controversy in the courts.
1. SEC Amicus Appearances
As one ground of support for its "investor" approach, the Eason court
alluded to the many recent appearances by the SEC as amicus curiae wherein it
argued for adoption of a similar investor-oriented rationale. " Specifically, the
court referred to the SEC amicus brief in Superintendant of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 0 ' the last important Supreme Court decision involving Rule
IOb-5. The problem in deriving support from such pronouncements springs from
the administrative history surrounding Rule 10b-5. Issued by the SEC, these
historical documents reflect a contradictory viewpoint from that presently urged
by the Commission in its amicus appearances. Thus, in its initial disclosure to
the public of Rule lOb-5, the SEC explained its purpose as being to close
"a loophole in the protection against fraud administered by the Commission
by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase."'0 2 This expression of administrative intent was specifi-
cally relied upon by Judge Hand in Birnbaum and fostered the creation of the
purchaser-seller limitation therein.' So, in forsaking Birnbaum the Eason court
appears to have defaulted on its obligation to follow the prescriptions of adminis-
trative intent. Two factors regarding present-day reliance on such pronounce-
ments dispel the notion of impropriety in departing from their express language.
First, it has been argued that the Commission understated the purposes of Rule
lOb-5 in its original pronouncements.' Second, and more importantly, it must
be remembered that, unlike a legislature, an administrative body, such as the
SEC, has more than one opportunity to express its views; hence, it can change
its mind. Such a change has occurred within the Commission regarding Rule
lOb-5 as the SEC amicus briefs amply demonstrate. Since the language of Rule
lOb-5 is broad enough to support both viewpoints, past and present, there seems
100 See, e.g., Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972); Levine
v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 1971); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China
Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 870 (3d Cir. 1968);
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1967); Vine v. Bcnieficial Fin. Co.
374 F.2d 627, 633 n.6 (2d Cir. 1967); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964).
101 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
102 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
103 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
104 Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 Ala. L. Rev. 543, 584 (1971).
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no good reason to elevate the 1942 Release and other historical documents above
the Commission's present efforts as amicusY°5
2. Congressional Intent
A similar predicament confronts the Eason court because of its apparent
failure to consult the legislative history preceding passage of the Securities Ex-
change Act and, particularly, § 10(b) to ascertain the parameters of congres-
sional intent.
When Congress enacted the securities acts, it did not write on a clean slate;
rather, it wrote on top of a broad-based state law of corporations. Because of this,
it has long been argued that the Exchange Act was intended solely to regulate
transactions on the securities markets and not to invade the legitimate interests of
state law. A recent decision in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Landy v.
FDIC,10 6 emphasized this viewpoint:
When Congress enacted Section 10(b), it did not contemplate the protec-
tion of every person injured by a fraudulent scheme in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. Its immediate concern was the protection
of the purity of the informational system in the securities market.
1 0 7
Flowing from this interpretation of congressional intent has been an equally re-
strictive viewpoint on protected parties under § 10(b), again rooted in congres-
sional intent. As Landy makes clear, under this view, "the purpose of Congress
in enacting Section 10(b) was merely to extend to sellers of securities the same
protection that had been afforded to buyers under the 1933 Securities Act.""' In
validating these interpretations of congressional intent, adherents to this viewpoint
stress the legislative history surrounding passage of the Exchange Act and, specif-
ically, § 10(b)." 9
The Eason court interpreted § 10(b) in a wholly different sense. Relying
upon its plain language to ascertain congressional intent, the court construed §
10(b) expansively to include "investors" within its scope. Here again, disregard
for historical context hardly seems fatal, especially since any inquiry into statutory
intent must "begin with the language of the statute itself."' 0 Besides, there is such
a dearth of evidence regarding congressional intent in the legislative history of §
10(b)" that any generalizations drawn from it appear dubious. There ap-
pears no logical necessity for the remedial sweep of § 10(b) to be so narrowly
restricted given the broadly interpreted remedial scope of the Exchange Act
generally.
112
105 See Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 342 n.6 (9th Cir. 1972).
106 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
107 Id. at 157.
108 Id. at 156.
109 See, e.g., statement by Senator Duncan U. Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 78 Cong. Rec. 2270-71 (1934).
110 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968).
111 1 A. BROMBERO, SEcuxuTms LAW: FAuD--SEC RULE lob-5 § 2.2 (Supp. 1970).
112 Dudley v. Southwestern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303. 306 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 858 (1971) ; see also Supt. of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
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3. Implied Support of Bankers Life
More critical support problems appear when the Eason court relies on
developments in the case law to validate its abolition of Birnbaum.
Of initial importance is the court's use, or misuse, of the Bankers Life opinion
in a supportive context." Conceding that no Supreme Court holding was in-
consistent with the view that only purchasers or sellers were protected by Rule
lOb-5,1 4 the court of appeals--in a bit of judicial legerdemain--sought to
demonstrate otherwise in repeated references to Bankers Life. Of damning
significance is the following passage:
[S]peaking for a unanimous court in Superintendant of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., Justice Douglas stated that the crux of the case was the
fact that "Manhattan suffered injury as a result of deceptive practices touch-
ing its sale of securities as an investor."
1 5
Use of the Bankers Life decision in this manner, as a bootstrap to formulation of
a viable doctrine of "investor" protection, has met staunch resistance in the
courts." 8 In Mt. Clemens Industries, Inc. V. Bell"' Judge Ely noted, in com-
menting upon the use of "isolated, conclusory statements""' drawn from Bankers
Life to support the appellants' contention that Birnbaum be abolished, that:
These statements, standing alone, might seem to support a literalistic ap-
proach to the statute, yet when they are read in context, it becomes ap-
parent that the Supreme Court's opinion lends more credence to our view
[that Birnbaum be maintained] than that of appellants. Throughout the
Bankers Life opinion Mr. Justice Douglas repeatedly emphasized that Man-
hattan, the claimant there, was to be afforded standing under the Act
because of its status as a defrauded "seller" of securities."3
Reliance by the Eason court on the Bankers Life decision to substantiate its "in-
vestor" approach appears misplaced and erroneous.
4. The Course of Judicial Opinion
An even more serious question is whether the Eason court misread the
"course of judicial decision since 1952""' in concluding that it "has actually
recognized that the class of protected persons is broader than merely purchasers
and sellers.""'
113 The Supreme Court expressly refused to rule on the continued vitality of the purchaser-
seller limitation on standing in the Bankers Life opinion. Supt. of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.10 (1971).
114 Eason v. GMAC, No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973), slip opinion at 8, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,344, at 95,163.
115 Id., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,344, at 95,162.
116 Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1973); James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483
F.2d 944, 948 '(6th Cir. 1973); Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 344 (9th Cir.
1972); Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1311 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972).
117 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
118 Id. at 344.
119 Id.
120 Eason v. GMAC, No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973), slip opinion at 7, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 1 94,344, at 95,162.
121 Id.
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Although the cases cited by the Eason court to substantiate its conclusion 22
do represent an expansion of the Birnbaum rule beyond the traditional limitations
of "purchaser" or "seller," it has vigorously been argued 12S that this liberality in
application is no more than a reflection of the Supreme Court's admonition to
construe § 10(b) "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes,"'2' and by no means a repudiation of the Birnbaum rule itself.
This view is substantially supported in recent case law. No appellate opinion,
except Eason, has yet overruled Birnbaum where the plaintiff's claim involved
money damages.121 Moreover, where the purchaser-seller rule has been ignored-
as in actions seeking injunctive relief 28 -the result is more properly viewed as an
exception to, rather than departure from, Birnbaum.' Finally, it cannot be
ignored that even where the expansion of the Birnbaum rule is most obvious, in
cases involving "constructive" ' 12 or "forced"'29 purchasers and sellers, the courts
continue to pay homage to Birnbaum by working within its central premise.
s3
Thus, reliance upon developments in the course of judicial decision anteced-
ent to Birnbaum to repudiate its standing limitation in favor of an "investor" ap-
proach also appears misplaced.
C. Response to the Question of Ouerriding Considerations
Two public policy considerations for maintaining Birnbaum were confronted
by the Eason court. Both were rejected. The first, that abolition of the purchaser-
seller limitation would unleash a flood of federal litigation, was dismissed by the
court of appeals as "really a matter of speculation."'21 This attitude belies the
breadth of the "investor" approach. When coupled with the corresponding de-
emphasis upon standing suggested by the Eason court, it appears certain to en-
courage continued attempts at transforming state law questions of corporate mis-
management into lOb-5 complaints. The advantages of a federal forum, both
procedural32 and substantive,' 3 in this area of law seem too bountiful to indicate
122 Note 71 supra.
123 See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1973); ME Clemens
Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972).
124 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
125 See notes 49 & 50 supra.
126 Note 46 supra.
127 See Whitaker, The Birnbaum Rule: An Assessment, 23 Ala. L. Rev. 543, 576 & n.137
(1971).
128 Note 44 supra.
129 Note 45 supra.
130 The Eason court acknowledged this, but viewed it as a further indication of the loss of
integrity sustained by the Birnbaum rule. Eason v. GMAC, No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28,
1973), slip opinion at 7, OCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 94,344, at 95,162.
131 Id. at 9, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,344, at 95,163.
132 If the action can be based on the federal securities acts, the plaintiff, under the liberal
venue provisions, has a degree of choice in selecting the forum and, also, can obtain jurisdiction
over the defendant parties through extraterritorial service of process. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(1970). Moreover, the plaintiff may rely on the liberal pleading and discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure available in a federal forum.
133 See note 47 supra. Judge Stevens acknowledged this advantage: "It is not unlikely
that the principal cause of concern about the increase in this type of litigation is an assumption
that it will always be much easier to allege and prove a 10b-5 case than a common law fraud
case," Eason v. GMAC, No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973), slip opinion at 9 n.28,
CGH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,344, at 95,163.
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otherwise. Courts have been quick to condemn these juristic transplants as dis-
serving the function of investor protection. " It is true that the "causal connec-
tion" test proposed in Eason would act to curtail such interlopers, but since the
causal relationship between the fraud and the plaintiff's loss is a substantive ele-
ment of Rule lOb-5, it will ordinarily involve matters of proof which should be
handled on the merits. As such, a further reason arises to seek a federal forum
under the Eason approach, linked to the marked reluctance of corporate de-
fendants in lOb-5 actions to risk trial, the so-called "strike" or "nuisance" suits."' 5
A similar lack of regard for public policy is demonstrated in the court of
appeals' out-of-hand dismissal of the second consideration examined, national
consistency. Again, this cavalier attitude belies the magnitude of the problem.
Because securities transactions are conducted on a nationwide scale, often without
regard for geographical boundaries, substantial reasons exist to foster national
consistency in securities regulation, particularly in the lOb-5 area. Reduction in
the mischief of forum shopping, a problem magnified by the potential flood of
10b-5 plaintiffs, provides a vivid example. More importantly, national con-
sistency promotes the predictive function of the law which, in turn, facilitates
legal counseling, and leads eventually to a greater degree of awareness of legal
responsibility by corporate officialdom-a very significant consideration where
Rule 10b-5 is involved. In this regard, the Eason court might well take notice of
the caveat set down in Herpich v. Wallace,3 6 by Judge Ainsworth:
Protection for investors is of primary importance, but it must be kept in mind




So long as significant procedural and substantive advantages await them in
the federal courts, there will be plaintiffs who prostitute the broad language of
Rule 10b-5 by using it as a touchstone to a federal forum in a purely state law
cause of action for corporate mismanagement. The Birnbaum court recognized
this and drew a stringent line of demarcation between persons protected and un-
protected under the Rule-the purchaser-seller rule-and applied it at the outset
in the form of a limitation on standing to sue. Such an approach was too rigid
and inflexible to accommodate the variety and complexity of fraud in contem-
porary securities markets."' Because of its severity, the Birnbaum rule may
actually have sanctioned the continuance of dishonest practices in securities
transactions by rendering Rule 10b-5 impotent to protect one entire group of
injured parties-those investors who purchase stock and then watch helplessly
134 See, e.g., Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
135 Largely obviated in the state courts by security bond requirements, where the action is
based on the federal securities acts federal policy controls and ordinarily will preclude imposition
of state procedural requirements, such as posting a security bond, and, hence, remove an effec-
tive deterrent to such suits. See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
136 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
137 Id. at 804.
138 See Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5,
54 Va. L. Rev. 268, 275-76 (1968).
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as it decreases in value because of fraudulent "insider" manipulations designed
to depress market price.1"'
In contrast, the Eason court offers a functional approach to protected per-
sons,"" geared to the vagaries of contemporary securities markets. If accepted
as law, it would rectify the deficiencies in investor protection under Rule 10b-5
wrought by Birnbaum and its progeny. The standing question would be returned
to its proper role in a 1Ob-5 suit, the determination of whether the claim presented
is a "case" or "controversy" within the meaning of Article III." Legal niceties
of "purchasers," "constructive" purchasers, "forced" purchasers, and the like
would become obsolete, replaced with an "investor" classification determined
by reference to "causal connection," a test rooted in the limiting phrase of the
language of Rule 10b-5. As such, the unwarranted bias against nonselling share-
holders explicit in Birnbaum would be abolished. Furthermore, by forcing courts
to examine the merits of each claim in order to determine whether it states a
cause of action under 10b-5, the Eason approach would promote the further
delineation of the substantive scope of Rule lOb-5 and thereby bring a greater
degree of certainty to this highly volatile area of statutory interpretation. A final
advantage of the Eason approach is that it sidesteps the common criticism leveled
at other suggested substitutes for the purchaser-seller rule-that third parties
would then be able to reap the benefits of another's misfortune-since under
Eason no plaintiff would be able to recover absent proof that the 10b-5 violation
resulted directly in injury to him. Thus, the successful plaintiff under the Eason
approach would not be usurping another's right, but merely vindicating his
own loss.
In "curing" Birnbaum's procedural disabilities, however, the Eason court
exposes its flank to attack on Birnbaum's substantive ground: that cases of purely
state law corporate mismanagement should be isolated solely within the state
courts. Under the Eason approach the area of proscribed activity within Rule
10b-5 could become so great that the beneficial aspects of the Rule would no
longer warrant the proscription."4 2 That is, the extension of Rule 10b-5 to en-
compass all forms of corporate mismanagement, a proposition long feared by
adherents to Birnbaum's substantive holding, 4 ' could become a reality. Such an
extension of legislative purpose could conceivably be justified on the ground
139 It has been argued that nonselling shareholders, when denied a 10b-5 claim because
of the Birnbaum rule, are not left without a remedy for two reasons: (1) Wall Street Rule;
this rule, embodied in the maxim, "If you don't like the management, sell your stock," ignores
the fact that the nonselling shareholder may already have incurred paper losses which could
seriously impair his collateral, particularly if the stock was purchased on margin, see Comment,
The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 684, 698 (1968); (2)
Availability of a state cause of action; although readily available, the state law cause of action
for corporate mismanagement has been roundly criticized as inadequate and often biased against
shareholders, especially minority interests, see Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assess-
ment 23 Ala. L. Rev. 543, 617 & n.289 (1971).
140 See Tcherepnin v. Knight 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1972).
141 See Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186, 200 (1962); Ass'n of Data Processing Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150. 169 (1970) '(dissenting opinion). But see Jaffe, Standing Again,
84 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 634 (1971).
142 See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970).
143 See, e.g., Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule lob-5, 49 Tex. L. Rev.
617, 646-49 (1971); Folk, Corporation Law Developments-1969, 56 Va. L. Rev. 755, 812-14
(1970); Patton, The "Purchase of Sale" Restriction of SEC Rule lOb-5--Judicial Extension
of a Federal Remedy, 18 Cath. U.L. Rev. 463, 486-87 (1969).
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that fraudulent mismanagement always constitutes a practice "in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security" because it necessarily affects the rights of
someone who has purchased some shares in the corporation at some time in the
past. Fearful of such a development, sister circuits will be wary of the Eason
decision. It is doubtful, therefore, whether Eason will be accepted as a viable
alternative to the modified Birnbaum concept now in vogue. Hence, conflict
within the circuits is an inevitable outcome and, as such, a Supreme Court res-
olution of the Eason-Birnbaum dichotomy must be considered.'"
Thus far, the Supreme Court has been markedly reluctant to hear claims
involving § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 4 5 so denial of certiorari appears a likely pos-
sibility. If utilized by the Court, it would precipitate a case-by-case evolutionary
adaptation of the Eason approach; 14 6 but such an approach would induce the
practice of forum shopping, wreaking havoc in the courts. Also, if the develop-
ment of the Birnbaum Doctrine is any indication, the laggard pace of evolution-
ary change may be such that the Eason approach would be obsolete before its
acceptance could become absolute. Of course, the Supreme Court might simply
overrule Eason and, in doing so, affirm the validity of the Birnbaum rule. Again,
this is a likely possibility, especially since it has been argued that the Court has
already impliedly affirmed Birnbaum in the Bankers Life decision.' 47 Here, too,
problems would lie, rooted primarily in the Draconian strictures of the Birnbaum
rule itself. Finally, the Court could affirm Eason, using it as a vehicle to issue a
far-ranging opinion setting out all the elements of a cause of action under lOb-5
in its various circumstances. Apart from doubts whether it would or even could
undertake such a task,'48 the Court would be subject to the immediate criticism
that in affirming Eason it was opening the floodgates to federal litigation. More
seriously, it would be subject to the charge that in proselytizing the Eason ap-
proach it was attempting the judicial expansion of a concept, "federal corporate
law," better left to Congress and the legislative process.' 49 Thus, should Eason
be appealed, the Supreme Court would be hard put to resolve conclusively the
Birnbaum-Eason controversy.
The apparent inability of the Supreme Court to settle this dispute drama-
tizes what is the crux of the current I Ob-5 dilemma. Courts are simply unable to
reconcile the twin goals of "investor protection" and "federal integrity" within
the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Birnbaum court tried, but it
erred on the side of investor protection. The Eason court tried, but it erred on
the side of federal integrity. So, it appears no judicial prophylaxis can hope to
accomplish a full measure of investor protection without severely straining the
144 The appellees have filed a petition for certiorari before the United States Supreme Court,
42 U.S.L.W. 3511 (1974).
145 SEC v. Nat'l Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), was the first decision considered by the
Supreme Court involving a 10b-5 claim.
146 The Eason court urged such a case-by-case evolutionary adaptation of its central thesis:
"In any event, we deliberately avoid the temptation to try to formulate a succinct substitute for
Birnbaum, trusting that the appropriate limits to the rule will best be defined through the
process of case-by-case adjudication." Eason v. GMAC No. 72-1722 (7th Cir. Dec. 28. 1973),
slip opinion at 10 n.29, CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. f 94,344, at 95,164.
147 See note 119 supra.
148 See Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule 10b-5?, 24 Bus. Law. 69, 74 (1968).
149 See, e.g., Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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federal court system in the process--at least within the present statutory con-
struction of § 10(b).
In this light, Judge Hays' impassioned plea in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.'5 is particularly apposite. "May the Future, the Congress or possibly the
SEC itself be able to bring some semblance of order by means of workable rules
and regulations in this field.. .. "' Discounting the Future, both Congress and
the SEC could undertake a reformulation of protected persons under § 10(b)
and Rule IOb-5 in order to resolve the current controversy. The SEC has offered
such proposals to Congress in past legislative sessions,' 52 but now it seems content
to argue its proposals in the courts through amicus appearances rather than
beseech the Congress for doctrinal reformulations. 5' Moreover, the discretion
of the SEC in reshaping Rule lOb-5 sans legislative change in § 10(b) is severely
limited,'54 a function of its administerial capacity. Thus, if reformulation of
principles is to be undertaken in this area, as the Eason-Birnbaum controversy
indicates it must, then Congress appears the proper body to do so.1r
A final question involves the extent of any redefinition of purpose to be
undertaken by Congress with regard to § 10(b). Proponents of "federal corpo-
rate law" argue for a comprehensive codification. 5 ' Such claims are based on
the notion that state corporate law has not kept pace with the growing sophistica-
tion of the corporate endeavor, can no longer hope to protect adequately the
rights of shareholders vis-h-vis "big business," and has already been largely sub-
sumed under an unwritten federal law of corporations.' 7 The better view, in
keeping with the express intent of the Securities Exchange Act'" and the pre-
cepts of the Erie Doctrine, 5' seeks a more circumscribed purpose; the solution
of the Birnbaum-Eason controversy through a statutory amendment to § 10(b).
Without such congressional action, § 10(b) will remain an area "where




150 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
151 Id. at 889 (dissenting opinion).
152 The '57 and '59 legislative programs submitted to Congress by the SEC, if enacted,
would have amended Section 10(b) to read: "to use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of or any attempt to purchase or sell. . . ." S. 2545 & H.R. 9327, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957), S. 1179 & H.R. 2480, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (emphasis added).
153 See note 100 supra.
154 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRsuD---SEC RULz lOb-5 § 12.9 (1969).
155 See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 413 (1962). But see Bahlman, Rule lOb-5: The
Case for Its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation Law, 37 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 727, 730 (1968).
156 See, e.g., Henkel, Codification-Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws,
22 Bus. Law. 866 (1967); see also 1 A. BROMBERG, FRAUD: SEcuariEs LAw--SEC RULE
lOb-5 § 12.9 (1969).
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